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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SNIFFING OUT THE PROBLEMS: A CASENOTE STUDY OF THE
ANALYSIS AND EFFECTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
IN ILLINOIS v. CABALLES

I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Hypothetical 1

Imagine a client comes to you with a tale of police invasion of privacy.
Angry and discouraged, he recounts the events of his recent move from the
West Coast to a quiet, Midwestern city in hopes of a new start. In the spirit of
starting anew, the client first washed out the inside of his car, adding an air
freshener to retain the clean smell. Since he was required to wear suits to work
on the West Coast, suits were practically all that he owned, so he dressed in a
crisp suit. Planning ahead, he hung two others in the back of the car in case the
rest of his belongings, which were being shipped to him in his new Midwestern
city, did not arrive in a timely manner. In the anticipation and excitement of
beginning his new life, he tended to drive slightly faster than the posted speed
limit. At one point, while traveling approximately six miles per hour over the
speed limit, he was greeted with flashing lights in his rearview mirror.
Somewhat annoyed that his arrival in the Midwest would be delayed, he
begrudgingly pulled to the shoulder of the highway.
Typical with routine traffic stops for speeding, the police officer exited his
car, approached the client’s vehicle, and asked for the client’s license and
registration. Willing to cooperate, the client handed over the documents,
which the officer took back to his car to use in performing a background
search. Satisfied that the client had no outstanding warrants, the officer
returned to the client’s car and informed him that he was going to issue a
citation for speeding. By that time, aggravated that his arrival was being
pushed back and he was receiving a ticket, the client began to get restless.
The officer picked up on the client’s restlessness and began to question the
client: Had he ever been arrested before? Had he ever done drugs before? Did

1. Hypothetical based loosely on the facts of People v. Caballes. The description of the
circumstances surrounding the car trip itself stem from the story that Caballes provided to the
officer who actually stopped him, although it is unclear whether Caballes’ rendition is true. See
People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ill. 2003), vacated and remanded by 543 U.S. 405
(2005).
417
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he currently have any drugs or other contraband in his car? 2 The client
answered all of the officer’s questions in the negative, growing more and more
impatient with the elongated traffic stop. Then the officer asked if the client
would consent to a search of his vehicle, suggesting that the client should not
mind a quick search if he does not have contraband, or anything else to hide, in
his vehicle. Thinking the officer had no right or reason to do so, the client
declined to consent, only to have the officer inform the client that a second
officer and his drug-sniffing canine had just arrived to assist in the traffic stop.
Still in the process of writing out the speeding citation, the original officer
asked the client to step out of the vehicle while the second officer walked the
dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the trunk area of the car, and the
officers began searching the trunk. 3
The client, upset at what he feels was an invasion of his privacy and a
blatant disregard for his wishes not to have his vehicle searched, now asks you
whether this sequence of events was legal. After all, as the client points out, he
had only been stopped for speeding and had already declined consent to search
before the canine began the sniff.
B.

The Solution in Illinois v. Caballes

In early 2005, the United States Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a suspicionless canine sniff performed during the course of

2. Many courts recognize this type of questioning as constitutional. See, e.g., United States
v. Francis, 140 F.App’x. 184, 186 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d
1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) and noting that “[o]nly unrelated questions which unreasonably
prolong the detention are unlawful”); United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1016,
1020 (Dist. N.M. 1996), aff’d, 142 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 1998); but cf. United States v. Murillo,
255 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[d]uring a traffic stop, a police officer is
allowed to ask questions that are reasonably related in scope to the justification for his initiation
of contact[,]” but that “[i]n order to broaden the scope of questioning, he must articulate
suspicious factors that are particularized and objective”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 948 (2002). Even
under a Murillo type of analysis of the questioning at issue here, an argument could possibly be
made that the questioning regarding whether Caballes had drugs in his vehicle was warranted
because the officer could articulate suspicious, particularized, and objective factors, namely that
Caballes appeared agitated, said that he was moving but had no belongings with him, was
wearing a suit to move, and smelled of air freshener.
3. Several courts consider a drug sniffing canine’s alert to constitute probable cause to
search an area. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1182 (1996); United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994); Romo v.
Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523,
1527 (10th Cir. 1993)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 947 (1995). For a discussion of why probable
cause that there are drugs in the vehicle allows the police to automatically search the vehicle
without first obtaining a warrant, see infra Section II(B), entitled “The Fourth Amendment and
Vehicle Searches.” For a discussion of the possible problems with the automatic creation of
probable cause through canine alerts, see infra Section VI(B), entitled “Alternative Analyses.”
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a routine traffic stop for a traffic violation in Illinois v. Caballes. 4 The Court
held that a canine sniff of the exterior of a car during a legitimate stop for a
traffic violation did not constitute a search of the vehicle and, therefore, did not
warrant Fourth Amendment protection, 5 overruling the Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision to the contrary and allowing the subsequent prosecution of
Caballes to include evidence of drugs found in his trunk during the traffic
stop. 6
This Casenote examines the soundness of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Illinois v. Caballes. Beginning with Part II, this Casenote explains the
constitutional history relevant to a complete understanding of where the
decision fits in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the specific
rules governing contraband and automobiles. It then examines in Part III the
Fourth Amendment arguments for both the State of Illinois and Mr. Caballes,
as well as the analytical approaches taken by the Illinois courts and the United
States Supreme Court in applying search and seizure law to the Caballes case.
Part IV turns to the decisions of lower courts and reviews the subsequent
handling of the Caballes analysis and holding, focusing on the practical
consequences the decision has produced. Finally, Part V focuses on what the
author believes to be the problematic implications of the Caballes decision.
Part V also offers several alternative analyses the United States Supreme Court
may have used in making its decision in the case. This Casenote ultimately
concludes that the decision in Illinois v. Caballes likely will produce
undesirable effects that counter public policy, but that could have been avoided
had the Court utilized any of several different methods for analyzing the case.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment declares that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” 7 The Fourteenth Amendment applies the
protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to state governments. 8
Although the United States Supreme Court originally interpreted a “search”
under the Fourth Amendment as being associated with and determined by only
the targeted location of the state action, 9 the Court drastically altered this
4. See generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
5. Id. at 410.
6. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from “mak[ing] or enforce[ing] any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . “ U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that wiretapping did not
constitute a search and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the actual wires
subject to the wiretapping were not a part of the person, papers, or effects named in the Fourth
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analysis in Katz v. United States. 10 Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz set
forth the test subsequently used by the Court for whether the Fourth
Amendment applied to specified state actions of invasions of privacy: first, the
person against whom the search was performed had to exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy in the objects to be searched; second, the expectation of
privacy had to be “one that society [was] prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” 11
A.

The Fourth Amendment and Contraband

Focusing on the second prong of Harlan’s Katz test, the United States
Supreme Court has emphasized the lack of an objective “reasonable”
expectation of privacy in contraband of any kind. 12 Accordingly, the Court has
held that state conduct revealing contraband, and only contraband, does not
infringe upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus does not implicate
Fourth Amendment protections. 13
In United States v. Place, the Court considered whether the temporary
detention of a man’s luggage in order to perform a canine sniff of the luggage
violated the Fourth Amendment. 14
In Place, officers at the Miami
International Airport observed Place engaging in suspicious behavior while he
was waiting to purchase a ticket to New York, but because his flight was
departing soon, the officers allowed him to take his scheduled flight to New
York. 15 The officers did, however, have the opportunity to observe that
Place’s luggage tags listed addresses which did not match each other or the
address corresponding to the phone number he had provided to the airline. 16

Amendment and because the wiretapping was not the equivalent of trespassing into the
defendant’s house).
10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
11. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Under this test, a man’s conversation in an enclosed
phone booth was held to be protected by the Fourth Amendment because the man had, by
shutting the door to the booth, exhibited a subjective expectation that his conversation would be
private and because society would recognize as reasonable the expectation that a conversation in
an enclosed phone booth would be private. Id.
12. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (recognizing no legitimate
privacy interest in the possession of cocaine); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983)
(recognizing no reasonable interest in possession of contraband).
13. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
14. Place, 462 U.S. at 697-98. The Court’s Place decision was, however, foreshadowed by
a footnote in a prior decision in which the Court specifically stated that “officers, with founded
suspicion, could have detained [the suspect] for the brief period during which Florida authorities
at busy airports seem able to carry out the dog sniffing procedure.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 506 n. 10 (1983).
15. Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
16. Id.
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Because of their suspicion, the Miami officers contacted officers at the New
York airport, advising them of the situation. 17
The New York officers also observed Place engaging in suspicious
behavior and approached Place, who falsely claimed his luggage had already
been searched in Miami. 18 Place declined consent to search his luggage, at
which point the officers seized the luggage and transported it to a separate
airport in New York in order to subject the luggage to a canine sniff. 19 More
than an hour and a half after having seized the luggage from Place, the officers
actually subjected the luggage to a sniff; the canine alerted to one of the two
seized bags, and the officers detained the “alert” bag over the weekend in order
to obtain a search warrant. 20 Upon receiving the warrant and personally
searching the bag, the officers found over 1,000 grams of cocaine. 21 Place’s
subsequent conviction for possession and intent to distribute reached the
United States Supreme Court after the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York denied Place’s motion to suppress the evidence
gained from the search because the officers had reasonable suspicion that the
luggage contained drugs and after the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the denial due to the prolonged nature of the seizure of
the luggage. 22
Because the police could, based on their observations of Place’s actions
and the inconsistent addresses, articulate some reasonable suspicion that
Place’s luggage contained contraband, the Supreme Court approved of a
temporary detention of the luggage “provided that the investigative detention
[was] properly limited in scope.” 23 The Court then weighed the extent of the
intrusion against Place’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy and concluded
that temporary detention for the purposes of performing a non-intrusive, sui
generis 24 canine sniff did not weigh heavily on the man’s unreasonable
expectation of privacy in the contraband in the luggage and in fact did not
constitute a search at all under the Fourth Amendment. 25 The Court did,
however, place a temporal limitation on the detention of the luggage for the
purposes of obtaining a canine sniff, considering both the actual length of the
detention and the diligence exercised by the police in obtaining the canine

17. Id.
18. Id. at 698-99.
19. Id. at 699.
20. Id.
21. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
22. Id. at 699-700.
23. Id. at 706.
24. The Court considered canine sniffs to be sui generis precisely because they are nonintrusive and reveal only the presence of contraband. A sui generis search is one that is “unique”
or “of its own kind.” BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 502 (5th ed. 2003). Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
25. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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sniff, although it declined to put a per se temporal limitation on detentions of
personal effects. 26 On the specific facts of Place, the Court determined that,
because the officers had advance warning of the need for the drug sniffing
canine but still did not bring the canine to the appropriate airport, the officers
did not act with diligence in obtaining the sniff. 27
In accordance with its decision in Place, the United States Supreme Court
decided United States v. Jacobsen the following year, in which a substance
seized from a suspect was subjected to chemical testing to discover whether
the substance was illegal. 28 The Court held that the chemical testing did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the chemical testing
revealed, and was able to reveal, only contraband in which the defendant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 29
B.

The Fourth Amendment and Vehicle Searches

In addition to a practically non-existent privacy interest in contraband,
individuals also have a diminished privacy interest in their vehicles, such that a
warrant is not always, or even typically, required in order for police to search
an automobile. 30
For example, if a subject is arrested in, near, or immediately after exiting
his vehicle, then a search incident to arrest may include the passenger
compartment of the vehicle as well as the individual himself. 31 The Supreme
Court expressly allowed for searches of the person incident to arrest in Chimel
v. California, reasoning that the need to ensure officer safety and to avoid the
possible destruction of evidence outweighed the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment

26. Id. at 708-09. Under this standard, the officers in Place exceeded the temporal limits of
the detention when they detained the luggage for ninety minutes but were actually capable of
having the canine available to perform the sniff at the airport where Place arrived and as soon as
the luggage was detained. Id. at 709-10.
27. Id. at 709-10.
28. See United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984).
29. Id. at 123.
30. In addition to the two justifications for vehicle searches discussed here, police may
perform a valid vehicle search through an “inventory search.” Officers may use an inventory
search whenever an arrestee has been apprehended from his vehicle or a vehicle is impounded.
The inventory search involves three interrelated justifications: (1) to protect the property of the
owner of the vehicle; (2) to protect the police from theft claims by the vehicle’s owner; and (3) to
protect the police from potentially harmful items in the vehicle, such as a bomb. South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). One limitation on this type of search is that the police
department performing the inventory search must have a policy that requires such a search. See
id. at 372. The inventory search is not typically applicable to situations like that in Caballes,
although such a search may have come into play in the Caballes case had Caballes been arrested
for his speeding violation rather than merely given a citation.
31. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 621 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
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right to privacy in his person. 32 This rationale was subsequently extended to
allow for the search of an arrestee’s vehicle incident to arrest, so long as the
arrestee was seized in, near, or immediately after exiting the vehicle. 33
However, the Court did limit the scope of a valid search of an automobile
incident to arrest to the passenger compartment of the vehicle, which did not
include the trunk. 34
Under United States Supreme Court precedent, officers may arrest
motorists for violating civil traffic laws without violating the Fourth
Amendment. 35 The United States Supreme Court approved of such arrests in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 36 implicitly allowing for searches of automobiles
incident to arrests for traffic violations. 37 The Court has, however, expressly
rejected the vehicle search incident to citation, since the officer safety and
preservation of evidence rationales do not apply as readily to citations as they
do to arrests. 38
Absent an arrest, but with probable cause, officers may still search a
vehicle without a warrant in some circumstances. 39 This so-called “automobile
exception,” justified by the mobility of the vehicle, applies whenever the police
have probable cause to believe a search of the vehicle will reveal contraband or
evidence of a crime. 40 Sixty years after creating the automobile exception, the
Court in California v. Carney added the “diminished expectation of privacy”
rationale to the justifications for the automobile exception, explaining that
individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in their vehicles because
of the widespread government regulation of automobiles. 41
C. Canine Sniffs, Vehicle Searches, and the Fourth Amendment
Forced to combine its contraband and automobile precedents in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, the United States Supreme Court considered the

32. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
33. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 621; Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
34. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623; Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 n.4.
35. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
36. Id.
37. The fact that searches incident to arrest had been allowed for nearly forty years before
Atwater was decided and the fact that the court discussed no limitations on police activity
incident to arrest for a civil traffic violation implies that the Court intended to allow for such
searches. See id. at 354.
38. See generally Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
39. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1985); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
40. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. The temporal limits on the ability to search were addressed in
Chambers v. Maroney, in which the Court rejected a search conducted after the police had
brought the vehicle back to the station and required that the search be conducted at the scene
where the vehicle was originally encountered. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
41. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93.
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implications of valid traffic stops together with canine sniffs, although only in
the context of roadblocks stops and not in the context of stops for traffic
violations. 42 In Edmond, the Court first examined the validity of roadblock
stops for the primary purpose of performing canine sniffs on vehicles. 43 The
Court distinguished between roadblocks with the primary purpose of
discovering drunk drivers (i.e., those in which sobriety tests were
administered) and those with the primary purpose of controlling drug crime
(i.e., those in which canine sniffs were conducted). 44 The Court disallowed
canine sniffs as the primary purpose of a roadblock because the sniffs did not
serve the safety purposes necessary to justify roadblocks. 45 The Court did not
stop its analysis there, however, and turned to the issue of validity of the
canine sniff itself. Emphasizing that canine sniffs are not searches for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the Court was careful to point out that the canine sniff
itself did not invalidate the roadblock; the sniff did not turn a valid roadblock
stop into an invalid search. 46 In other words, the Court implied that a valid
roadblock, one designed to discover drunk drivers, could potentially involve
the use of canine sniffs as its secondary purpose without being deemed an
unconstitutional stop or search of the vehicle. 47
Before the Supreme Court’s determination of Caballes, an officer in most
jurisdictions was prohibited from terminating the traffic stop by issuing a
citation or warning, returning the motorist’s documents, and only then
informing the motorist that he was required to wait for the drug sniffing canine
to arrive on the scene. 48 This distinction had less to do with the actual act of
the canine sniff and more to do with the illegal detention of the motorist
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 49 Despite this bright-line rule,
some courts were willing to accept as legal a canine sniff occurring

42. See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). Roadblock stops are
distinguishable from traffic violation stops in that roadblocks involve no reasonable suspicion or
probable cause and require only a public safety justification, whereas traffic violation stops
require at least reasonable suspicion, and more often involve probable cause, that a traffic
violation has occurred. This distinction becomes important to the United States Supreme Court
when analyzing Caballes. See infra Section III(C), entitled “The Court’s Analysis.”
43. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.
44. See id. at 41-42.
45. Id. at 44.
46. Id. at 40.
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (8th Cir. 1998).
49. Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1894-95 (2004). Once the
citation was issued and the driver’s documents returned, the legal stop for a traffic violation
terminated, and any subsequent detention required probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or some
other justification. Id.
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immediately after the termination of the traffic stop. 50 In the wake of this
weak prohibition, Caballes had the potential to formulate a rule workable for
officers and courts but also fair to motorists.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A.

Procedural History of Illinois v. Caballes

When the United States Supreme Court received the Illinois v. Caballes
case, both parties to the case had experienced acceptance and rejection of their
arguments in the Illinois state courts. Both the trial court and the appellate
court ruled against Caballes in his motion to suppress the drugs discovered in
his trunk after the police, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
conducted a canine sniff of his vehicle during a traffic stop for speeding. 51 The
appellate court based its holding on the assertion that canine sniffs do not
require even reasonable suspicion in order to be legal. 52
Not surprisingly, 53 the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
courts and held that the trial court should have granted Caballes’ motion to
suppress the drugs discovered in Caballes’ trunk as a result of the canine sniff
and subsequent search. 54 The Illinois Court based its decision on People v.
Cox, 55 a case with facts similar to those in Caballes, in which the Illinois
Supreme Court applied the Terry test 56 to decide whether a canine sniff was

50. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2002) (requiring a
showing that the sniff itself was unduly lengthy in order to constitute an illegal detention), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 992 (2003); State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623, 629 (Ariz. 2003). This may have been so
because of evidentiary considerations (it would be difficult to show that the sniff was performed
after the issuance of the citation, or vice versa) or it may have been so because courts simply felt
the benefits of discovering drug trafficking or use outweighed the seemingly insignificant
intrusion into the driver’s privacy and time.
51. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203-04 (Ill. 2003).
52. Id.
53. Incidentally, the Illinois courts have consistently limited the scope of actions officers
may take during or after a traffic stop, although not always with the approval of the United States
Supreme Court. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219, 231 (Ill. 2003) (holding that a
warrant check not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth
Amendment), vacated, 543 U.S. 1135 (2005); People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1030-31 (Ill.
2003) (prohibiting questioning not connected to the purpose of the initial stop), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 959 (2004); People v. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d 799, 811 (Ill. 2003) (extended detention of
motorist found unreasonable); People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 281 (Ill. 2002) (canine sniff not
permitted during traffic stop for traffic violation), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 937 (2003); People v.
Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 566 (Ill. 1999) (consent rendered void by actions of officer).
54. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205.
55. See generally People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002).
56. The Terry test asks (1) whether the officer’s action was justified in the first place and (2)
whether any subsequent action was reasonably related in scope to the justification of the officer’s
initial actions. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
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reasonable. 57 The Court noted that although Terry itself did not deal with a
traffic stop, Illinois and federal courts had previously applied the Terry test to
traffic stop situations; therefore, the Illinois Court determined that the Terry
test was applicable to Caballes. 58 Since the officer initially had probable cause
to stop Caballes for speeding, the first prong of the Terry test was satisfied and
only the second prong presented an issue for the Illinois Court. 59 Referring to
its analysis in Cox, the Court required “‘specific and articulable facts’ to
support the stopping officer’s request for the canine unit,” which the Court
could not find on the facts of Caballes since the stopping officer had not
smelled marijuana or observed other factors that would have led him to believe
that Caballes had marijuana in his trunk. 60 The Court rejected the argument
that the lack of belongings in Caballes’ car, the smell of air freshener,
Caballes’ business dress, and Caballes’ nervousness constituted enough
evidence for reasonable suspicion to perform the sniff. 61 Because the officer
could not produce the requisite specific and articulable facts, the Court held
that the canine sniff unreasonably broadened the scope of the stop in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 62 As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
the lower courts and held that Caballes’ motion to suppress the evidence
discovered as a result of the canine sniff should have been granted. 63
B.

The Argument for Illinois

In its brief to the United States Supreme Court, Illinois relied heavily on
the U.S. Supreme Court precedent established in Place, which stated that
canine sniffs for drug detection purposes were not searches. 64 Reiterating the
argument in Place that a canine sniff does not reveal any non-contraband
items, Illinois argued that canine sniffs truly are sui generis, thus, they do not
constitute searches and do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. 65
Illinois further argued that canine sniffs actually enhance Fourth Amendment
protections by exposing individuals to the least intrusive means of discovering
whether they are carrying contraband. 66 Citing several cases in which the U.S.
57. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 204.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 204-05.
62. Id. at 204. The Court noted that the fact that the stopping officer had not summoned the
canine officer himself was of no consequence, since “the overall effect remains the same.” Id. at
204.
63. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205.
64. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004
WL 1530261 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 6-7. Apparently, the logic here is that the right to privacy is preserved when only
minimal intrusions are used to gain information.
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Supreme Court utilized the holding in Place without questioning it, Illinois
further asserted that the principles underlying Place were established
constitutional law. 67
In order to round out its claim that the particular vehicle sniff in Caballes
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the State relied on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the Court
reaffirmed the use of canine sniffs in accord with the Fourth Amendment but
disapproved of the initial stopping of vehicles absent reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or a justifying safety purpose. 68 Illinois argued that because
the Court specifically stated that the use of a canine sniff did not turn the stop
into a search in Edmond, the canine sniff also did not turn the stop into a search
in Caballes. 69
In addition, Illinois also attempted a “plain smell” argument. 70 Under this
rationale, individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the smells
in the common air, such as the smell of marijuana emanating from a vehicle’s
trunk. 71 Because the officers would have been able to search the car if they
could smell the marijuana, the State argued that the officers were likewise
justified in searching the car because the canine could smell the marijuana and
alert the officers to its detection. 72 In both cases, the marijuana was within
“plain smell.” 73
Turning to the analytical framework question, the State claimed that the
Illinois Supreme Court erred in applying the Terry two-pronged test to
determine the validity of the canine sniff. 74 Illinois first argued that the Terry
standard “[did] not govern a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle at a traffic
stop supported by probable cause” because the Terry standard applied only to
stops in which the police merely had reasonable suspicion and nothing more. 75
Responding to Caballes’ assertion that the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Berkemer v. McCarty supported the application of the Terry
standard, Illinois cited a footnote in Berkemer that apparently limited the
effects of the Court’s analogy. 76 Before concluding this precedent established
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 7-8.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 8-10.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Id. at 10.
73. See id. at 8-10. This argument plays on the “plain sight” doctrine, under which officers
may seize contraband within the plain sight of officers who are legally on the premises or are
conducting legal activities (essentially if the contraband is out in the open where anyone could
view it). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) for a brief explanation.
74. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 11.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 13-14. The footnote reads: “No more is implied by this analogy than that most
traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry.
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that Terry did not apply to the Caballes situation, Illinois cited several other
decisions by the United States Supreme Court which, although not raised by
Caballes, did not support the application of Terry to traffic stops for traffic
violations. 77
Illinois also claimed that even if Terry were applicable, the canine sniff
passed the Terry standard, although it did not explain this position. 78 The
reasoning may simply have been that the sniff was analogous to the pat-down
in Terry itself in that it neither significantly intruded upon the stopped person’s
privacy because both were designed to detect only specific items (drugs in the
canine sniff and weapons dangerous to officer safety in the Terry pat-down).
The reasoning also may have been that the canine sniff was not a search at all,
so that a sniff that did not unreasonably prolong a stop could not be deemed a
violation of Terry. In fact, on this issue, the Amici Curiae Brief filed by
Arkansas and Twenty-Seven Other States asserted that a canine sniff does not
impermissibly expand the scope of a traffic violation stop simply because a
canine sniff is what the Amici Brief referred to as a Fourth Amendment “nonevent.” 79 According to the Brief, this is because canine sniffs do not interfere
with the stopped person’s freedom any more than the initial stop, which, in the
case of Caballes’ stop, was supported by probable cause. 80 The Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner offered another rationale
for why the canine sniff at issue passed the Terry test, 81 if that were even the
applicable test. The United States in its Brief claimed that during a Terry stop,
officers may use reasonable means to confirm or dispel any reasonable
suspicion that they may have regarding the subject and that under this analysis,
the canine sniff that does not physically intrude upon the subject’s privacy and
quickly confirms or dispels the officer’s suspicion is a reasonable tool which
passes the Terry test. 82

We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the
bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 440 n.29 (1984).
77. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 15 (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev.,
542 U.S. 960 (2004); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683-88 (1985); Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001)).
78. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 12.
79. Brief of Arkansas and Twenty-Seven Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 13-14, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 1475506.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, Caballes, 543
U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 1530263.
82. Id. at 17-18. This logic, at least at first glance, seems to be flawed in that the officer
obviously is allowed to use reasonable means for confirming or dispelling the reasonable
suspicion that gave rise to the stop initially, but the claimed “reasonable suspicion” did not exist
here and was not the initial reason for the stop.
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While not connected to any specific legal argument already raised by the
parties or the other amici, the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and the
Major Cities Chiefs Association (the “Associations”) added another
justification for allowing canine sniffs such as the one in the Caballes case. 83
Claiming that the canine sniffs were minimal intrusions on the privacy of those
stopped during traffic violation stops, the Associations argued that such sniffs
played a vital role in detecting harmful and prevalent contraband and that
without the sniffs, officers would not be able to effectively fight the War on
Drugs. 84 The Associations’ argument provided yet another justification for
Illinois for allowing the canine sniff in Caballes.
C. The Argument for Caballes
In his brief to the United States Supreme Court, Caballes began by
confronting the argument presented by Illinois that the canine sniff does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 85 In response to the argument that canine
sniffs are not physically intrusive, Caballes argued that the extremely wellestablished rule from Katz precluded such an argument, since Katz itself held
that a conversation heard with devices outside of the telephone booth was
nonetheless protected by the Fourth Amendment. 86 Likewise, the United
States Supreme Court’s recent decision that using thermal-imaging constituted
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment undermined the
physical intrusion argument. 87
On the issue of the analogy of the canine sniff to the “plain view” doctrine,
Caballes claimed that the act of bringing a canine to the scene of a traffic stop
was not the same as merely opening ones eyes to what is within sight; in other
words, police officers, under “plain view,” are not required to ignore what they
can obviously see, but the canine sniff situation involves assertive action to
bring the dog to the search. 88 Rebutting the claim by Illinois that canine sniffs
are not embarrassing or inconvenient, Caballes claimed that, on the contrary,
83. Brief of Amici Curiae The Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and The Major Cities
Chiefs Association in Support of Petitioner at 4, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923),
2004 WL 1530262.
84. Id. at 4-6.
85. Brief for Respondent at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL
2097415 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
86. Id. at 13-14.
87. Id. at 14. In Kyllo v. United States, agents from the U.S. Department of the Interior used
a thermal imager to view heat sources within the defendant’s house. Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001). The Court, rejecting the government’s argument that the thermal imager
revealed only the heat radiating from the house, held that use of the thermal imager constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment because it was a “through the wall” device (as opposed to an
“off the wall” device) that revealed intimate, private activity within the house, such as when the
occupants of the house took baths or showers. Id. at 34-36.
88. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 15-16.
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the experience of being pulled over, singled out, and then searched in plain
view of other motorists who are not receiving the same treatment indeed
embarrasses and inconveniences the individual who is stopped. 89 In addition,
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the ACLU of Illinois in
their Amici Brief asserted that not only is the use of a drug-sniffing canine
potentially embarrassing and inconvenient, but it is also intimidating to many
drivers, most of which are innocent. 90 In addition, the ACLU pointed out that
these canines may be dangerous to drivers and have been reported as biting or
even attacking drivers, making the canine sniff potentially much more than just
inconvenient. 91
Finally, in response to the argument that canine sniffs reveal only
contraband, Caballes conceded that properly conducted sniffs will typically
reveal only contraband; however, Caballes asserted that this did not mean that
the subjects of canine sniffs do not deserve Fourth Amendment protection. 92
Caballes pointed out that Kyllo, in determining whether the Fourth Amendment
applies, demands consideration of the nature of the place to be searched as well
as the nature of the items sought, asserting that, although there may have been
little privacy interest in the contraband itself, there was still a privacy interest
in the trunk, which called for Fourth Amendment protection. 93 Caballes also
produced evidence from other cases and studies questioning the reliability of
canine sniffs. 94 For example, Caballes cited one case in which evidence
showed that of twenty-eight canine alerts, only one resulted in the discovery of
illegal drugs, implying that canine sniffs do not always signal the presence of
contraband. 95 In addition, Caballes asserted that canines often alert to smells
other than that of large amounts of contraband, such as another dog or
money. 96 Finally, Caballes presented evidence that canines can produce false
alerts as a result of errors by the officer himself, such as failing to distinguish

89. Id. at 17.
90. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Illinois as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 17-18, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL
2097416.
91. Id. at 18-19.
92. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 17. The Court seizes on this language to support
its own analysis, ignoring the pages of qualifications that follow the initial statement. See
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; see also infra Section III(C), entitled “The Court’s Analysis.”
93. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 18.
94. Id. at 18-19.
95. Id. (citing Merret v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995)).
96. Id. at 19 (citing Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (in which a
canine reacted to the smell of another dog); United States v. $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d
442, 453 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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between true alerts and mere “interest” in an area, or using a canine without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 97
Turning to his own assertive arguments, Caballes first claimed that the
sniff of his vehicle was constitutionally unreasonable without a showing of
reasonable suspicion to believe that his vehicle contained drugs. 98 Conceding
that probable cause is not always required to justify a search, Caballes argued
that balancing his even slight interest in the privacy within his trunk with the
non-existent safety justifications for performing the sniff, his privacy interests
demanded that the sniff not be performed. 99
Applying Terry v. Ohio, which Caballes thought to be the test applicable to
his circumstances, Caballes asserted that although the police had probable
cause to stop him for speeding, they did not have probable cause to believe that
he was carrying drugs. 100 Therefore, the canine sniff violated the Terry bar
against broadening the scope of a stop beyond that which initiated the stop. 101
Finally, Caballes made a policy argument that possible problems with
pretextual stops required a bar against using canine sniffs during traffic stops
without any reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe a motorist had
contraband, 102 even in light of the Whren v. United States decision.
D. The Court’s Analysis
The Court first addressed Caballes’ reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of his vehicle. Citing its own decision in Jacobsen, the Court
asserted that Caballes had no reasonable expectation to privacy in the drugs in
his trunk. 103 The logical conclusion, at least for the Court following its
analysis in Jacobsen, was that any state conduct that uncovers only the
presence of the drugs in the trunk is presumed to be legitimate. 104
The Court responded to Caballes’ arguments against canine sniffs being
sui generis by citing the point in Caballes’ own brief where he claimed “drug
97. Id. at 20 (citing United States v. Guzman, 75 F.3d 1090, 1096 (6th Cir. 1996); and
Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog,
85 KY. L.J. 405, 430 (1997) (asserting that canine sniffs are “least effective when they survey a
random population”)).
98. Id. at 20.
99. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 21-22.
100. Id. at 23-24.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. at 32-34. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Whren v. United States that the individual
intentions of stopping officers do not play a role in deciding whether a stop is constitutional.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
103. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). The Court’s reasoning necessarily
focuses on the drugs in the trunk, as the Court would not have asserted that Caballes had no
reasonable expectation to privacy in any legal contents in his trunk. See California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)).
104. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
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sniffs are designed, and if properly conducted are generally likely, to reveal
only the presence of contraband.” 105 The Court went further, however, and
rejected the argument that even if canine sniffs were sometimes in error,
private information would be exposed to police. 106 Furthermore, regardless of
the possible hypothetical problems with canine sniffs in general, the Court
recognized that the trial court had found no such problems with the specific
sniff in Caballes, allowing the Court to dismiss the notion of canine reliability
altogether. 107 In addition, the Court found this conclusion to be in line with its
recent decision in Kyllo v. United States, in which it held that thermal-imaging
detection without a warrant or probable cause violated the Fourth
Amendment. 108 The Court distinguished canine sniffs, through which only
drugs can be detected, from thermal-imaging detection, through which private
details such as when someone takes a bath, which do not necessarily reveal the
presence of contraband, could potentially be revealed. 109
Since Caballes did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
drugs in his trunk, the minimal intrusion presented by the canine sniff did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 110 Accordingly, the Court placed no
probable cause or reasonable suspicion requirement on the ability to conduct a
canine sniff for drugs during a legitimate traffic stop for a traffic violation,
noting, however, that “a seizure . . . justified solely by the interest in issuing a
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if . . . prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete [the issuance].” 111 In other words, the
Court placed a “reasonableness” limitation on the duration of such encounters
but refused to put any other limitations on the ability of police to conduct
canine sniffs during the course of a traffic stop or even to expand on what
“reasonable” may mean in a traffic stop situation. 112

105. Id. at 409 (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 17).
106. Id.
107. Id. Presumably, had the canine in Caballes’ specific case presented a question of the
reliability of the individual canine’s sniffs, then the Court could have addressed the issue further.
From the Court’s analysis, however, it is unclear whether one particular canine’s unreliability
would cause the Court to disallow canine sniffs of this sort in general. In other words, even if
Caballes had been successful in arguing the unreliability of the specific canine in his case, other
defendants in similar situations would not necessarily benefit from Caballes’ success, since
canine sniffs in general are still considered to be reliable, sui generis tools.
108. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
109. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 407.
112. This limitation on the duration actually has nothing to do with the canine sniff itself but
rather points to the fact that a prolonged detention of a driver beyond the time required to issue
the warning or citation could result in the detention being deemed an arrest for Fourth
Amendment purposes, an arrest for which the officer would have no probable cause or likely even
reasonable suspicion. Id.
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Justice Souter’s Dissent

In his avid dissent from the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Souter
attacked not only the holding the Court reached but also the precedent upon
which that holding was based. 113 He began his dissent by calling into question
the analysis used by the Court to make its decision in Place, specifically, the
classification of canine sniffs as sui generis. 114 Citing several opinions dealing
with the accuracy of canine sniff alerts, Justice Souter concluded that at least
“dozens” of alerts out of “hundreds” will actually be false positives. 115 The
prevalence of such false positives suggested that canine sniffs are, at least
some of the time, revealing something other than the presence of drugs 116
meaning canine sniffs are not sui generis after all. 117
Responding to the Court’s suggestion that canine sniffs, reliable or not, do
not reveal any non-contraband items in an individual’s possession, Justice
Souter aptly noted that although the sniff itself may not reveal non-contraband
items, “the sniff is the first step in a process that may disclose ‘intimate details’
without revealing contraband.” 118 While searches are allowed to reveal noncontraband items if conducted with probable cause, and in most cases, a
warrant, the operative words for Justice Souter were “searches” and “with
probable cause.” 119 Justice Souter did not suggest that drug sniffing canines
may never be used, only that their use constitutes a search requiring probable
cause. 120 In this sense, the canine sniff at issue was, in Justice Souter’s
opinion, more akin to the thermal-imaging search in Kyllo v. United States, as
both the canine sniff and the thermal imager could potentially produce
evidence of contraband as well as legitimate activities. 121

113. See id. at 410-17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 410-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411-12 (Souter, J., dissenting). The “dozens” out of “hundreds”
language raises an interesting question as to how reliable canine sniffs would have to be in order
to qualify as sui generis searches. Perhaps the Majority would accept even “dozens” of false
alerts as minimal enough to justify the sui generis label, in which case Souter’s argument does
nothing to counter the Court’s justifications for allowing the sniffs. As the Court said in its own
opinion, however, the issue in this particular case seemed to be irrelevant. Id. at 409 (majority
opinion).
116. Justice Souter does not, on the other hand, intend to imply with his cynicism that the
alert of a drug sniffing canine does not provide at least reasonable suspicion, and possibly
probable cause, that drugs are present. However, the initial question of whether canine sniffs are
searches under the Fourth Amendment is a different issue requiring a different analysis. See id. at
413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 413-14.
120. Id. at 414.
121. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413.
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Having asserted that canine sniffs are searches under the Fourth
Amendment, Justice Souter then applied the Edmond rule that “the object of
enforcing criminal law does not, without more, justify suspicionless Fourth
Amendment intrusions.” 122 Because the responding officer did not have
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that Caballes was carrying
drugs in his car, Justice Souter turned to the Terry requirement that a search
must be related to the purpose for the temporary detention in order to satisfy
the Fourth Amendment. 123 Absent some connection between speeding and the
search for drugs, which accurately described the situation in Caballes, the
canine sniff of Caballes’ vehicle constituted an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 124 Consequently, Justice Souter would
have deemed the marijuana discovered in Caballes’ trunk to be the “fruits” of
an unlawful search 125 and would have suppressed the evidence accordingly. 126
Finally, in responding to the majority opinion’s reliance on United States v.
Jacobsen and its claim that state conduct revealing only contraband cannot be
considered a search, Justice Souter pointed out that Caballes is distinguishable
from Jacobsen because the state action in Jacobsen occurred when the
contraband was already in the custody of the police, at a time when Jacobsen
surely could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contraband. 127 For this and the other aforementioned reasons, Justice Souter
concluded that canine sniffs are searches governed by the Fourth
Amendment. 128
F.

Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent

Building on Justice Souter’s brief mention of the applicability of Terry v.
Ohio to the Caballes case, Justice Ginsburg also dissented from the Court’s

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine was first referred to in Nardone v. United
States, in which the Court stated that it would exclude evidence (the “fruit”) that was gained
through an unlawful search or seizure (the “poisonous tree”) or was gained as a direct result of the
unlawful search or seizure. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). While the taint
from an unlawful search can be attenuated by discovery through an independent, untainted
source, see, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988), or through inevitable
discovery by other means, see, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984), neither of these
cases appears to be present here since no other source likely could have informed the police of the
contraband in Caballes’ trunk and it was unlikely that the officers would have discovered the
contraband anyway.
126. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 414 (Souter, J., dissenting).
127. The state action in Caballes occurred when the contraband was still in the custody of
Caballes, hidden in his trunk, away from public view. Id. at 415-17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 415-17.
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majority opinion. 129 Agreeing with the Illinois Supreme Court in its analysis
of the issues in Caballes, Justice Ginsburg began her analysis with an outline
of the Terry doctrine, which requires that the officer’s stop of the individual be
legitimate in its inception and that, absent new probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, the officer not broaden the scope of the detention beyond that which
led to the original stop. 130 Acknowledging that the Court itself had previously
analogized a traffic stop for a traffic violation with a Terry stop, 131 Justice
Ginsburg noted that the temporal scope of the traffic stop was not the only
relevant factor in determining whether the canine sniff at issue
unconstitutionally expanded the traffic stop. 132
Consequently, Justice
Ginsburg considered the vast difference in purposes of the traffic stop for the
traffic violation itself and the subsequent canine search, concluding that the
canine sniff, conducted for the purpose of enforcing criminal law outside of the
traffic code, impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop and was,
therefore, unconstitutional. 133 Justice Ginsburg did, however, note that canine
sniffs for explosives presented a different issue, since explosives implicate a
public safety rationale not present in the search for drugs. 134
Recognizing that the majority analyzed only whether the traffic stop itself
was justified in determining whether Caballes’ rights were violated, Justice
Ginsburg criticized the majority for failing to finish the analysis by applying
the second prong of the Terry test. 135 Unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg
would have applied Terry as such: The first prong was satisfied because the
officer had probable cause to stop Caballes for speeding; the second prong was
not satisfied, not because the stop was unreasonably prolonged but because the
canine sniff broadened the scope of the stop since the sniff constituted a drug
investigation and the stop was initially for a traffic violation. 136
Justice Ginsburg further challenged the Court’s decision for exposing both
the potentially guilty and the potentially innocent to what will likely be
stressful and embarrassing encounters with the police during what previously
were routine traffic stops for traffic violations. 137 Perhaps carrying the
argument to the extreme, or perhaps foreshadowing future events, Justice
Ginsburg expressed concern that the Court’s decision in Caballes would allow

129. Id. at 417 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 418-19.
131. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
132. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 419-22.
134. Id. at 423.
135. Id. at 421-22.
136. Id. at 421-22.
137. Id. at 422. The language in Ginsburg’s challenge regarding the potentially innocent
appears to hint at the potential the Court’s holding has for resulting in pretextual stops or even
harassment.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

436

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:417

suspicionless canine sniffs of cars parked in public or even those stopped at red
lights. 138 Finding yet another problem with the Court’s holding, Justice
Ginsburg noted that by giving the police the ability to conduct a canine sniff
without any probable cause and even in light of a denial of consent to search,
the Court effectively stripped individuals of the right to ignore and deny police
requests to search. 139
Unsettled with the probable affects of the Court’s majority opinion, Justice
Ginsburg would have held that the canine sniff during a routine stop for a
traffic violation, without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle contained drugs, was a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 140 Together, the dissents by Justices Souter and Ginsburg
provide at least one alternative analysis the majority could have used, and they
raise several unsettling concerns with the decision the majority did reach.
IV. SUBSEQUENT USES OF CABALLES
While many courts have undoubtedly used Caballes in its least offensive
manner, 141 some courts have misapplied Caballes or applied the case in a way
that magnifies the concerns raised by the decision. In addition, courts have
already applied the Caballes reasoning and analysis to situations arguably
vastly dissimilar to that in Caballes, raising concerns for further implications.
Some of the subsequent cases citing to Caballes have interpreted the
“reasonableness” standard for the duration of a stop and sniff in such a way
that may not withstand an actual “reasonableness” test. For example, in United
States v. Martin, the defendant was pulled over for speeding on a highway, and
after thirty minutes of questioning by the stopping officer, the defendant
waited twenty minutes for a drug-sniffing canine to arrive and waited another
ten minutes before he was arrested for possession of a weapon and narcotics. 142

138. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s concerns may
seem far-fetched, but Lisa Madigan, attorney for the State of Illinois in Caballes actually stated in
oral argument that she felt that, since canine sniffs are not searches, there would be nothing
wrong with approaching people walking down the sidewalk and subjecting them to suspicionless
canine sniffs. See Oral Argument at 5-6, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL
2663949.
139. Caballes, 542 U.S. at 423 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 425.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 355-56 (6th Cir. 2005) (justifying an
initial canine sniff with the Caballes precedent but refusing to allow for a second canine to be
brought to the scene after the initial canine did not alert); United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d
767, 771-72 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing for a canine sniff under Caballes reasoning when the
officers already had suspicion that the car contained contraband).
142. United States v. Martin, 422 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2005). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accepted this prolonged detention because the questioning was
warranted by the fact that Martin did not have a driver’s license with him and because reasonable
suspicion of concealing contraband arose during the questioning. Id. at 602.
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Such a case seems to undermine assertions that canine sniffs typically take
only a minute or even seconds to complete and do not inconvenience drivers.
Furthermore, the “reasonableness” standard may be ineffective in
distinguishing between what truly is a reasonable or justified duration and what
is an unreasonable or purposefully elongated duration. For example, the
United States District Court for the District of Idaho in United States v. Brown
held that just over five minutes was a reasonable length of time for an officer
to complete a citation while waiting for a canine to arrive but stated that seven
or eight minutes would possibly have been unreasonable. 143 The court failed
to explain exactly why less than two minutes may have made a difference in
the reasonableness analysis. In addition, when determining whether the
duration of the stop was in fact reasonable, the court virtually ignored the
stopping officer’s testimony that he was “not going to let [the driver] go until
such time as [the officer with the canine] arrived.” 144 These cases are
representative of the lack of guidance Caballes gave to officers and courts
alike in determining the temporal bounds of detentions involving canine sniffs.
An officer cannot be sure that the sixty minute limit approved of in Martin is
actually acceptable or if the five to seven minute Brown standard is all that a
court will consider reasonable. Such uncertainty fails to restrain officers at the
time of the stop and fails to inform courts at the time of trial.
Magnifying a separate concern raised by the Caballes decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Johnson,
specifically brushed aside the issue of a driver’s consent to search the vehicle,
stating that “[Caballes] makes it irrelevant whether [the driver’s] consent for
the dog sniff was voluntary.” 145 In place of the voluntary consent issue, the
court substituted the issue of whether the trooper initiating the stop had
completed the citation process before the canine sniff occurred; finding that the
sniff began before the citation was written, the court affirmed the lower court’s
denial of Johnson’s motion to suppress. 146 Similarly, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Ringgold that “the
threat of a lawful dog sniff did not render [the detainee’s] consent involuntary”
and cited Caballes as supporting the holding. 147 In fact, the Court in Caballes
did not even face the issue of voluntary consent. Instead the courts in Johnson

143. United States v. Brown, No. CR05-73-S-EJL, 2005 WL 2847434, at *3 (D. Idaho Oct.
26, 2005).
144. Id. The court did state that it considered testimony that the officer was typically slower
at writing citations because of his lack of experience; however, the court still appeared to give
little to no weight to the officer’s admission that he was going to detain the driver until a canine
arrived, an admission that in itself tends to show an intent to purposefully elongate the detention
in order to obtain a sniff. Id.
145. United States v. Johnson, 123 F. App’x. 240, 240 (7th Cir. 2005).
146. Id.
147. United States v. Ringgold, 132 F. App’x. 116, 118 (9th Cir. 2005).
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and Ringgold seem to apply nonexistent assertions from Caballes. The
misapplication of Caballes in these cases speaks directly to the concern that
the Caballes decision will not only shave away any significance of the power
to decline consent to search one’s person or property but also, as Ringgold
implies, diminish one’s ability to deny consent to search without threats or
coercion.
A slightly related analysis was applied by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division in United States v.
Estrada-Jimenez. 148 There, the court held that the owner of a vehicle had
implicitly consented to a search of his car and that no unlawful search or
seizure had occurred. 149 In addition, however, the court applied the holding in
Caballes to support an “inevitable discovery” analysis, stating that even if the
search or seizure had been unlawful or the consent invalid, since a drug
sniffing canine was present at the time of the search, the canine would have
been permitted under Caballes to sniff the vehicle without probable cause and
likely would have alerted to the drugs in the vehicle. 150 This alert, the court
reasoned, would have provided probable cause for the search of the vehicle. 151
The reasoning of the Estrada-Jimenez court not only provides a way to
circumvent invalid consents but also unlawful searches and seizures, likely an
unintended but possibly logical result of the Caballes holding.
The United States Supreme Court in Muehler v. Mena, decided only weeks
after Caballes, applied Caballes to justify police questioning of Mena as to his
immigration status during a lawful detention. 152 Analogizing the questioning
in Muehler to the canine sniff in Caballes, the Court held that such questioning
was constitutional so long as the questioning did not unreasonably lengthen the
legal detention. 153 While the application of the Caballes reasoning to the
Muehler facts may not seem unjustified at first glance, such an application
becomes more threatening when one views application of the Caballes
decision as one way to justify increasing limitations on privacy and personal
freedom. If Caballes can be used to allow police more and more freedom of
action during traffic stops, it is hard to imagine where free reign will end and
the Fourth Amendment will again begin functioning.
Likely the most disturbing usage of the Caballes precedent, however, came
from two decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and the Florida Court of Appeals for the Fourth District. In United
States v. Brock, the defendant argued a canine sniff outside his bedroom door
148. United States v. Estrada-Jimenez, No. 1:05-CR-21, 2005 WL 2277073 (W.D. Mich.
Sept. 19, 2005).
149. See generally id.
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id.
152. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-02 (2005).
153. Id.
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violated the Fourth Amendment, distinguishing his case from Caballes by
pointing out the increased privacy interest in one’s house. 154 The court
disagreed, however, and held that the canine sniff did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 155 In making its decision, the court explained that the analysis in
Caballes, not that in Kyllo, applied to the sniff outside Brock’s bedroom
door. 156 The court reasoned that the distinguishing feature between Brock’s
situation and Kyllo’s situation was that the canine sniff in Brock could only
reveal the presence or absence of contraband and no other private information,
whereas the thermal imaging device in Kyllo could potentially reveal private
information as well as evidence of contraband. 157 In addition, the court
stressed that the police officers using the canine entered the home with the
consent of Brock’s roommate, implying that the situation was even more
analogous to Caballes, in which the officer also was legally outside of
Caballes’ vehicle. 158
In State v. Rabb, however, the Florida Court of Appeals for the Fourth
District approached the issue and the Caballes precedent differently. On
remand from the United States Supreme Court, 159 the Florida court drew the
distinction between the privacy interest in a home and the privacy interest in an
automobile that the Brock court was unwilling to make, stressing the increased
Fourth Amendment protections provided to homes. 160 The Florida court also
differed from the Brock court in its analysis by analogizing the canine sniff
used to smell what is inside the home with the thermal imager used to see what
is inside the home and ultimately held that the canine sniff violated the Fourth
Amendment. 161 These differences between Brock and Rabb exhibit a serious
problem with the Caballes precedent: Caballes may have unclear but vast
implications for situations beyond that of a canine sniff during a valid stop for
a traffic violation. 162

154. United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2005).
155. Id. at 697.
156. Id. at 696.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 697.
159. Florida v. Rabb, 544 U.S. 1028 (2005). The fact that the Supreme Court vacated the
Florida court’s previous decision and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the
Caballes decision is slightly disturbing in that the Supreme Court appears to be implying that the
Caballes decision has implications far beyond those in traffic violation situations. See infra
Section V(A), entitled “Concerns with the Court’s Decision” for an analysis of the problems that
may arise from such implications.
160. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
161. Id. at 1182, 1192.
162. For an in-depth discussion of the implications of the Caballes decision for future sui
generis devices, see Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How
to Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411 (2005).
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The subsequent uses of Caballes in general point out and magnify the
concerns raised by the Supreme Court’s analysis in the case. At a minimum,
they raise questions as to how lower courts are to interpret the
“reasonableness” standard, what role consent plays in current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and even how far the Caballes precedent may be
taken to chip away at Fourth Amendment protections.
V. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
A.

Concerns with the Court’s Decision

As evidenced by the subsequent uses of Caballes in lower courts, the
United States Supreme Court’s analysis and holding in Caballes present
several concerns with the future application of the decision. The Court’s
“reasonableness” standard could prove unworkable or itself unreasonable. The
holding may allow pretextual stops with the intent of performing canine sniffs
or may allow harassment or discrimination. Finally, the decision also
potentially undermines previous protections recognized under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Court’s resolution of the temporal issue with a “reasonableness”
standard leaves the issue virtually unresolved. 163 Even before the Caballes
decision, many cases involved courts allowing stops to be elongated while
waiting for a drug sniffing canine to arrive on the scene or while waiting for
the canine to perform its sniff. 164 While these cases were not governed by the
Caballes “reasonableness” standard, the courts reviewing the cases must still
have felt that the durations were reasonable, since even the Terry doctrine
requires that the detention not extend beyond what is reasonable and necessary.
Subsequent to Caballes, courts have continued this trend, allowing for
arguably over-extended stops in order to wait for or perform the canine
sniff. 165
Furthermore, the Court’s decision in United States v. Sharpe 166 may hold
the “reasonableness” door open further than is actually “reasonable.” There,
the Court accepted an officer’s continued detention of a motorist where he
justified the delay by explaining that he was awaiting an officer with more
training and experience with such stops and diligently pursued the retrieval of
163. One author has argued that the temporal issue should not, in fact, be an issue at all, since
holding that canine sniffs are simply not allowed during routine traffic stops would negate the
need for a temporal limitation on the scope of the sniff. LaFave, supra note 49, at 1895-96.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 776-77 (11th Cir. 1999) (nearly one
hour after the traffic violation stop began); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 761 (11th Cir.
1988) (nearly one hour after the conversion of the traffic stop into a Terry stop); Cresswell v.
State, 564 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1990) (forty-five minutes after traffic violation stop began).
165. See supra Section IV, entitled “Subsequent Uses of Caballes.”
166. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
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such an officer. 167 While the Caballes holding arguably puts a limit on such
practices with retrieval of canines, one can imagine the Court giving deference
to an argument that obtaining a canine was diligently pursued and the police
did everything in their power to complete the traffic stop as soon as possible or
even that the stopping officer was awaiting an officer with more canine
training to perform the sniff.
Even if such a Sharpe rationale is later barred by the Court, as one author
recognizes, several other tactics may be used to search the vehicle nonetheless:
requesting information about the vehicle, the driver, or the driver’s criminal
history; developing reasonable suspicion or probable cause, presumably
through questioning or monitoring the motorist; requesting consent to search
the vehicle, possibly even through threatening to obtain a drug sniffing
canine. 168 Whether these tactics would destroy an otherwise reasonable
detention remains to be seen.
In addition to the lack of clarity on the issue of “reasonableness,” the Court
failed to fully consider the policy implications of its decision, which will allow
police to use traffic stops as a pretext to searching for drugs. While the
Supreme Court rejected the pretext argument in Whren v. United States, 169 the
Court’s decision in Caballes may make the pretext problem more prevalent,
eventually requiring a re-evaluation of the Court’s holding in Whren. In giving
police the go-ahead to utilize minor traffic violations as a valuable tool in the
War on Drugs, the Court is essentially allowing police to target traffic violators
in high-crime areas simply because such motorists may be more likely to have
drugs in their vehicles. In one example pre-dating Caballes but presumably
allowed in light of the Supreme Court’s holding, the police stopped each and
every vehicle with a minor traffic violation on the highway, not for the purpose
of ticketing them, but rather for the purpose of running a canine sniff on the
vehicles in order to search for drugs. 170
In a related aspect, the Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes also opens
the door for allowing police to use canine sniffs in a discriminatory manner
and for harassment purposes. 171 Because the Court will no longer consider the

167. Id. at 686-87.
168. See Craig Scheiner, Time is of the Es’scents’: The Fourth Amendment, Canine Olfaction,
and Vehicle Stops, 76 FLA. B.J. 26, 32 (2002).
169. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
170. James A. Adams, The Supreme Court’s Improbable Justifications for Restriction of
Citizens’ Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 833, 846
(1999) (referring to United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192 (11th Cir. 1997), where the police
even told the motorist that they were searching for drugs).
171. LaFave, supra note 49, at 1896; Craig M. Bradley, Supreme Court Review: Saying No to
Drug Roadblocks, 37 TRIAL 80, 81 (Apr. 2001) (noting that the dissenters in Edmond left this
possibility open by forcing the majority to “vigorously insist that the use of the drug-sniffing dog
did not doom [the] search”).
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pretext argument, and because high-crime areas typically house minorities, the
Court appears to have, perhaps inadvertently, left minorities more exposed and
less protected by the Fourth Amendment, a result that offends equal protection
values. For example, it is unlikely that individuals in high-crime areas commit
significantly more traffic violations than do individuals in lower-crime areas,
but officers could target high-crime areas for traffic violation stops, ignoring
the traffic violations in lower-crime areas, simply because they may then use a
drug sniffing canine to search the car stopped in the high-crime area for drugs.
While blatant discrimination may not be upheld by the Court in light of civil
rights remedies against discrimination, so long as the police can cite a valid
stop for a traffic violation, the detention of the motorist and any subsequent
canine sniffs of the vehicle will presumably be valid and not necessarily
discriminatory. 172
Allowing for suspicionless canine searches as part of a routine traffic stop
also undermines both the consent doctrine and the prohibition against the
“search incident to citation.” This was reiterated in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
in Caballes when she recognized that “a sniff could substitute for an officer’s
request to a bus passenger for permission to search his bag.” 173 While
Ginsburg applied the possibility to situations like that in Bond v. United
States, 174 where the officer theoretically could have asked for consent to search
and then, when consent was denied, brought a drug sniffing canine aboard the
bus to sniff the bag regardless, one can imagine the situation being used in the
traffic stop context. In fact, this appears to have been the situation in Caballes,
and the court appears to have had no problem with this. If officers can simply
use the canine sniff regardless, the ability of a subject to deny consent in a
suspicionless situation is essentially nonexistent.
While the Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes dealt only with canine
searches during traffic stops, the decision may have implications beyond the
vehicle search. As one student-authored casenote on Caballes points out, the
Court may be headed down a slippery slope in that, as the Court chips away at
what privacy interests are protected by the Fourth Amendment, citizens begin
to expect less and less privacy. 175 Under the Katz standard, the diminishing of
reasonable expectations of privacy afforded to citizens affects whether a
Fourth Amendment search has even occurred; if the subject of the search has
172. See John F. Decker et al., Curbing Aggressive Police Tactics During Routine Traffic
Stops in Illinois, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 819, 836 (2005).
173. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 423 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. In Bond, the Court held that an officer’s squeezing a bus passenger’s bag, which was
stored in the overhead bin, violated the Fourth Amendment because the passenger had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag, even though it contained drugs. Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
175. Nina Paul & Will Trachman, Note, Fidos and Fi-don’ts: Why the Supreme Court Should
Have Found a Search in Illinois v. Caballes, 9 CAL. CRIM. L. R. 1, 21 (2005).
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no expectation of privacy because the Court’s previous decisions have stripped
him of that expectation, then there is no search. Likewise, if society does not
believe that a subject’s expectation of privacy was reasonable because of the
Court’s trend in limiting the expectation of privacy, then no search has
occurred.
To this extent, the second prong of the Katz test has become more a
judgment of what the Court believes society should find is a reasonable
expectation of privacy rather than what society actually does find is a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In essence, the Court may be laying a
foundation for future narrowing of what is considered a search by reinforcing
society’s diminishing expectations for privacy not just in cars but in other
places where society currently feels that an expectation of privacy is
reasonable. For example, after the Caballes decision, society may move
toward expecting canine sniffs to be performed on their cars, on their persons,
even on their homes absent any probable cause for performing the sniffs. If
society in fact expects such sniffs, then there is no recognition of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in these places, at least against canine sniffs. This
result, stemming directly from the Court’s own actions, gives the Court less
ammunition for striking down such sniffs because of the lack of a reasonable
expectation. In this way, the Court may find it difficult to stop itself from
further expanding what is a “reasonable” search under the Fourth Amendment.
Obviously, the Court’s analysis and holding in Caballes raises serious
concerns. The “reasonableness” standard provides little guidance for officers
and courts and potentially may lead to vastly different standards in different
jurisdictions.
The holding raises concerns regarding harassment or
discrimination through pretextual stops for the purpose of performing canine
sniffs. Finally and perhaps most disturbing, the holding has the ability to
undermine protections already recognized by the Court under the Fourth
Amendment.
B.

Alternative Analyses

While one team of student authors claimed the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes violated established Fourth Amendment
law, 176 this was not the likely case. Instead, the case was probably more that
the precedents on which the Court relied in making its most recent decision
were not consistent with the intended meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In
other words, although the Court followed established Fourth Amendment law
as had previously been announced, the Court’s previous decisions themselves
may be flawed. Alterations in previous decisions would have significantly
changed the Court’s decision in Illinois v. Caballes and perhaps led to a
decision more in line with the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
176. See id. at 13.
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The first problem with the precedents that the Court used in deciding
Caballes is that the Court in Place incorrectly applied the Katz standard when
it assumed that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against suspicionless
searches of places where contraband may be contained. For example, while
precedent holds that individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in
their vehicles, the trunk seems to be more protected than the passenger
compartment. 177 This means that an individual has some expectation of
privacy in his trunk, although not as much as he has in his house. If this is
true, then storing items of any sort in the trunk of a car would afford those
items at least some level of protection. Place held the opposite and would
presumably allow a canine sniff of the trunk, disregarding the reasonable
expectation of privacy in the trunk. To that extent, Place incorrectly assumed
that canine sniffs do not impinge upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Certainly the court in Katz would not have considered the argument that using
the electronic device to overhear Katz’s conversation did not constitute a
search because Katz’s conversation itself was evidence of illegal activity. The
outcome in Place suggests that the argument could be made and may even be
accepted by the Court.
The Court’s reliance on Place is also unwarranted in that Place did not
recognize that the reliability of canine alerts calls into question the sui generis
nature of canine sniffs and, therefore, the Fourth Amendment implications of
canine sniffs. If canine sniffs are not truly sui generis, then they must be
considered searches under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and require
probable cause accordingly. In many instances, the likelihood that a drug
sniffing dog is alerting to something other than a “secret stash” of drugs is
high. 178 For example, in United States v. $639,558 in United States Currency,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia acknowledged
that between seventy and ninety-seven percent of U.S. currency is tainted with
enough drugs, often cocaine, that a drug sniffing canine can and will alert to
the presence of the drugs on money. 179 In that case, an alert to the trunk of

177. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981).
178. See Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Comment, Constitutional Law: Ratifying Suspicionless Canine
Sniffs: Dog Days on the Highways, 57 FLA. L. REV. 963, 971-972 (2005); Paul & Trachman,
supra note 175, at 15-16; see generally Bird, supra note 97.
179. United States v. $639,558 in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714 n.2 (1992). For
other cases discussing the reliability of drug sniffing canines, see, e.g., United States v. Kennedy,
131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.3
(10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2001); Laime v. State,
60 S.W.3d 464, 475-76 (Ark. 2001); United States v. $242,484 in United States Currency, 351
F.3d 499, 511 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds by rehearing en banc, 357 F.3d 1225
(11th Cir. 2004).
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someone’s car may simply be an alert that large amounts of money are present
there, which in and of itself is not illegal. 180
In addition, even trained drug sniffing canines may “alert” to scents other
than those from drugs. In fact, in one case, a canine alerted to a girl’s person
not because the girl was carrying drugs but because she had the smell of her
own dog, which apparently was in heat. 181 Dogs, regardless of their training,
are still fallible animals; the chances of their alerting to something other than
illegal contraband is at least a possibility, revealing that canine sniffs, in
reality, are not sui generis. While Justice Souter’s dissenting argument that a
canine sniff is “the first step in a process that may disclose ‘intimate details’
without revealing contraband” 182 may be countered by the fact that searches
regularly disclose “intimate details,” Souter’s point implicates something
slightly different than what his words actually say. The result of a canine sniff
may, at least in some cases, lead to a physical search by the police officer of an
individual’s private places and things, without any actual probability that
contraband existed among them. The Fourth Amendment can bear searches
revealing intimate details only if there is an actual probability (probable cause)
that contraband is actually contained in the area of the search. Under this
analysis, the Fourth Amendment would apply to canine sniffs, and probable
cause, in the case of a vehicle sniff or probable cause in the case of perhaps a
residency sniff, would be required before such a sniff could be conducted.
In addition to the problems with the actual canine sniff process, some
lower courts have disregarded or distinguished Place and found that a canine
sniff constituted a Fourth Amendment search after all. 183 Like these cases,
Illinois v. Caballes can be distinguished from Place. In Place, the officers had
reasonable suspicion that Place was carrying drugs in his luggage, thus
authorizing a Terry stop of Place and a temporary detention of his luggage.184
However, the police officer conducting the traffic stop involving Caballes had
only probable cause that Caballes had violated a traffic ordinance. He did not
have probable cause, or even the reasonable suspicion present in Place, that
Caballes was carrying contraband in his vehicle. 185 This significant difference
180. Although a large amount of money may admittedly be evidence of illegal activity, the
point is not that police officers would have no interest in the money or searching the trunk but
rather that they would be required to obtain a search warrant or articulate probable cause that the
money is connected to illegal activity in order to search the trunk.
181. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
182. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., United States v. $53,082 in United States Currency, 985 F.2d 245 (6th Cir.
1993); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep.
Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1999).
184. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
185. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 205 (2003) (acknowledging that the police had
“nothing more than a vague hunch,” and not even a hunch of drug trafficking, but of “possible
wrongdoing”).
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suggests that Place may not have been the appropriate precedent to apply to
Caballes, since the police in Place conducted the canine sniff precisely
because of their reasonable suspicion.
The Court in Caballes took another wrong turn in its analysis by relying
upon its decision in Edmond. The Court in Edmond ironically leaves the door
open to canine sniffs as secondary purposes for roadblocks in the same opinion
that it shuts the door to canine sniffs as primary purposes for roadblocks.186
While one author seems to claim that Edmond supports a holding that drug
sniffing by canines during a traffic stop is illegal because it has no relationship
to the purpose for the traffic stop, 187 this argument seems to be undermined by
the Court’s implicitly leaving the door open for canine sniffs that are the
secondary purpose of a roadblock. After all, the canine sniff that occurs during
a traffic stop at a roadblock with the primary purpose of stopping drunk driving
is equally as unrelated to the purpose of the stop as is the canine sniff that
occurs during a traffic stop for a traffic violation. 188
Only if the Court in Edmond had refused to allow canine sniffs at
roadblocks altogether would Edmond support the “no relationship to the
purpose” logic. In fact, this likely would have been a more logical approach
for the Court to take in Edmond, since the Court’s allowance of canine sniffs
for secondary purposes completely defeats the purpose of its own ruling by
allowing the police to now kill two birds with one stone: The police may still
use canine sniffs, as they wished, but now they may also combine the sniff
with other privacy intrusions, such as stopping motorists to check for drunk
driving. This essentially puts the driver in a worse, not better, position than the
driver had been in before Edmond.
Finally, had the Court properly applied the Terry two-pronged test to the
Caballes case, the Court would have found that the canine sniff
unconstitutionally broadened the scope of the traffic stop of Caballes. While
Terry involved the stopping and frisking of suspicious persons walking down a
street, the Supreme Court has analogized the traffic stop with a Terry stop.189
Even noting Illinois’ assertion that the Supreme Court did not mean for Terry
to apply to traffic violation stops, the Court’s rejection of the ability to perform
a search of a subject or his vehicle incident to citation in Knowles v. Iowa
suggests that the Court also did not mean to give stopping officers unrestricted
186. Bekiares, supra note 178, at 967.
187. See LaFave, supra note 49, at 1896-97.
188. The analysis would be different, however, if the stop were for driving under the
influence of drugs, instead of alcohol, in which the canine sniff would actually be related to the
stop and presumably would not be legally troublesome. Id. at 1895 n.308.
189. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (specifically stating that a traffic stop is
more like a Terry stop than it is like a formal arrest). While the Berkemer case dealt with whether
Miranda warnings were required for conversations between a police officer and the subject of a
traffic stop, the analogy is still applicable.
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ability to perform suspicionless searches on those who are stopped. Therefore,
Terry appears more applicable to the Caballes situation.
Under Terry, only reasonable suspicion is required to temporarily detain
and pat search an individual. 190 Unfortunately for police officers and lower
courts, the Court did not attempt to define the phrase “reasonable suspicion.”
According to the Terry standard, the initial stop, here the traffic stop, must be
legitimate, and any subsequent action must be related to the reason for
initiating the stop. 191 Had the Court applied these standards to Caballes, it
would have found that, although the initial stop was valid, the subsequent
actions of the officers, particularly in conducting the canine sniff, illegally
broadened the scope of the stop since the initial stop had nothing to do with a
police drug investigation.
Regardless of possible flaws in the Court’s previous rulings and regardless
of the fact that the Court was indeed following its Fourth Amendment
precedent, the Court could have found the canine sniff of Caballes’ car to
violate public policy based on pretext, discrimination and harassment, and
even developing inconsistencies in the law, all of which are significant
concerns raised by the Court’s actual decision in Caballes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court missed three distinct chances to rekindle the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment and bar the use of suspicionless drug sniffing canines during
traffic stops for traffic violations. First, the Court could have corrected the
precedent established in Place and Edmonds and held that canine sniffs are, in
actuality, searches under the Fourth Amendment that illegally broaden the
scope of the traffic stop. Second, the Court could have applied Terry
principles and the Terry standard and held that the canine sniffs, because they
are unrelated to the initial reason for the stop, illegally broadened the scope of
the stop, assuming no showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that
the motorist was hiding drugs in his vehicle. Finally, the Court could have
rested a holding that canine sniffs during the course of a traffic stop for a
traffic violation on public policy, since a contrary holding allows for
widespread pretext stops, discrimination and harassment, undermines an
individual’s ability to deny consent to search, and paves the way for further
chipping away at Fourth Amendment protections.
While the Court itself is unlikely to alter its analysis or holding in Illinois
v. Caballes in subsequent cases, perhaps the concerns voiced nearly sixteen
years ago by Judge Kogan of the Supreme Court of Florida in his dissent in

190. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). The Court did reiterate, however, that a “severe
requirement of specific justification” existed in order to breach an individual’s privacy. Id. at 11.
191. Id. at 19-20.
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Cresswell v. State will at least bring to light the practical effects of the
decision: “If the zeal to eliminate drugs leads this state and nation to forsake its
ancient heritage of constitutional liberty, then we will have suffered a far
graver injury than drugs can ever inflict upon us. Drugs injure some of us.
The loss of liberty injures all.” 192
AMANDA M. BASCH ∗

192. Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 484-85 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting).
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